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Abstract 
 
Nation State Meets Popular Culture: The Construction of Chinese 
Nationalism in Anti-Japanese War Drama 
 
Jingzhi Chen, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisor:  Madhavi Mallapragada 
 
This thesis explores how Anti-Japanese War Drama in Chinese TV becomes a 
field of negotiation in which the forces of dominant state ideology, liberal market and 
alternative discourses meet. Focusing how the notion of Chinese nationalism has been 
constructed in the negotiation, this work examines TV dramas as a homogenizing 
national project in which market forces and state intervention are no longer at odd with 
each other. By critically reading representations and narratives of bandits and women in 
two dramas To Advance towards the Fire and Auntie Duohe, the study points out how 
dominant nationalist discourses attempt to incorporate the marginalized or disadvantaged 
group as a consistent part of the nation. However, the anti-Japanese war dramas still 
allow a space for the alternative discourse to emerge which disturbs the perceived 
coherence of the nation.  
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Introduction 
In September 2012, Japanese government announced the decision to purchase the 
long disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Island with 2.05 billion JPY (about 200 million USD) 
regardless the strong remonstrance of Chinese government (News Wires, 2012). Looking 
at fierce discussion on about Japan and Japanese on Tianya BBS, the largest BBS in 
Mainland China with more than 60 million registered users, I notice how the online space 
becomes outlet for the expression of anti-Japanese resentment. Discussions frequently 
address past history of the two countries, especially the anti-Japanese war from 1937 to 
1945, to justify their rage. What strikes me is how this specific period of history informs 
strong stereotype of Japanese people in the imagination of Chinese people. These 
stereotypes dominate the discussion in varied topics such Japanese foreign policy, 
transnational marriage and diasporic experience. For people who have never involved in 
the war, where do these stereotypes come from? Why these images are still persistent 
almost 70 years after the war? My curiosity on the origin of stereotypes makes me think 
about how I gain my knowledge about anti-Japanese war through watching films and TV 
dramas while growing up in urban China. I realize that, these traditional media give me a 
framework to construct my knowledge about not only Japan, but also China.  
With the encouragement of state policy, the number of TV dramas that base on 
anti-Japanese war history started to increase in 2005. With the support of state policy, the 
rise of this particular TV genre appeared to be more sustaining than the patriotic 
discourses in BBS. The discussion in BBS quieted down at the end of 2012, as the 
progress of territory dispute reached an impasse. However, anti-Japanese war drama still 
occupied a great portion of TV screens in China.  
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CHINESE NATIONALISM: PAST AND NOW 
The concept of nationalism arrived in China as a new spirit against expansionism, 
which took over the sovereignty of parts of Chinese territories for hundreds of years (Cui, 
2012, p.204). It is therefore a complex construction in which pride and glory of the past 
empire meets the humiliation imposed by imperialist invasion in the last two centuries. 
Zhao (2005, p. 132) further delved into the construction and noticed that Chinese 
nationalism, which derives from the ‘victim narrative’, is a ‘pragmatic nationalism’ 
utilized by the CCP to maintain people’s faith in the political system in times of political 
and economic transitions into a post- Communist society. The globalization process, 
which China cannot resist to be part of since early 1980s, constantly impacts the notion of 
Chineseness by bringing forth cultural pluralism (Song, 2012, pp. 406). It is necessary for 
China to build up a strong national identity in the globalization process, and the desire to 
restore pride from past collective experience becomes an essential component of Chinese 
nationalism (Cui, 2012, p.204).In the word of a former Chinese senior official, the 
external threat from outside the nation will strengthen national solidarity and further 
legitimize the role of CCP as the political leader (Zhao, 2005: 135).  
As Anderson (1983: 8) argued, nationalism is not a concrete ideology, whereas it 
should be treated as an ‘analytical expression’ such as kinship and religion. Therefore it 
is the formation of relation in the expression of nationalism that should be analyzed. In 
the flow of history, nationalism is not immune to change. It requires us to examine the 
reactive and pragmatic Chinese nationalism not only by paying attention to what the 
counterpart of nation is, but also by situating the relation formed in the expression of 
nationalism to contemporary condition to examine its meaning. In this sense, the 
representation of anti-Japanese war in the TV dramas in China should not only be treated 
as a way to convey political agenda at that time, but it would give us a window through 
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which we could uncover its pragmatic function embedded in the expression of 
nationalism. 
ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT IN CHINESE NATIONALISM 
The history of China did not move forward smoothly in last two centuries when 
the historical timeline was marked by the wars and occupations of imperialist powers 
(China-a Chronology of Events, n.d.). For China, Japan stands out as a special case 
among the former imperialist enemies for several reasons. The most significant factor 
that influences the current bi-lateral relations is probably the anti-Japanese war that lasted 
for 8 years from 1937 to 1945. In this historical record, Japanese army killed nearly 20 
million Chinese people, and conducted notorious deeds of Japanese army brought 
enormous trauma on China. For example, they used Chinese civilians as the test subject 
for bio-chemical weapon research, raped 20 thousand women during Nanking Massacre, 
and forced Chinese women to serve as military prostitutes (Johnson, 2003 and Wu, 
2005). 
Though the Chinese government decided not to let historical issue impede the 
economic relationship between China and Japan, suppressing growing popular 
nationalism posed to be an impossible task, given the fact that the Chinese attitudes 
towards Japan actually became more polarized and negative because of history issue 
during the first decade of 21th century (Reilly, 2010). It should be also attributed to a 
number of history related incidences that keep enforcing Chinese’s anti-Japan sentiment. 
For example, the newly revised Japanese textbook in 2005 portrayed its outrage in Asian 
countries as only a minor incidence during the process of ‘liberating Asian people from 
Western colonization’; in 2003 abandoned war-time Japanese chemical weapons buried 
in remote area in China injured villagers who found them (Wu, 2005). Of course, the 
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recent Senkaku/ Diaoyu Island escalated the anti-Japan sentiment in China again (News 
Wire, 2012).   
When notorious Japanese war-time images are still circulation through the mass 
media and history books in China today, mainstream Chinese news media covered 
Japanese Minister’s visiting to war criminal’s tomb. China interpreted this event as a 
signal suggesting that the Japanese government does not plan to give any official apology 
for its outrage in China (Cui, 2012 and Marquand, 2005). It seems the unrepentant 
attitude of Japan justifies why China still need to hold what happened in anti-Japanese 
war. However, Berger (2012 suggest Japan has actually been more repentant than it is 
credited by it neighboring countries. Berger points out the fact that Japanese prime 
ministers have orally apologized for the misdeeds of the country many times in 
diplomatic occasions, while China does not count them as official without any written 
document. From Berger’s observation on China’s diplomatic strategy with Japan, China 
does not give Japan opportunities to provide written apology. In other word, China might 
not really want to reconcile with Japan, because the government needs Japan to raise the 
tone of nationalism in order to suppress internal skepticism about CCP’s legitimacy 
(Berger, 2012). 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CULTURE OF CHINESE TV DRAMA 
Scholars (Schneider, 2012; Zhu, Kean & Bai, 2008) urge more to be academically 
explored about Chinese TV dramas, for is a prevalent component of culture to Chinese 
people’s everyday life. More importantly, this form of traditional media should be 
understood within ‘the parameters of political economy’, and it also plays a role in 
upholding Chinese TV as a ‘cultural institution’ (Zhu, Keane & Bai, 2008, p.2). 
According to Song (2012, p.411), although the ideologies Chinese TV dramas convey are 
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often “tight and close” to official discourses, they still offer open access for alternative 
ideological or political standpoints. Drawing in on the discussion of culture types put 
forward by Heite Wang, Song (2012, p.412) has suggested thinking of Chinese TV drama 
as a product within which the “official guiding culture”, “elite culture” and “popular 
culture” interwove. In the following three chapters, I will analyze anti-Japanese war 
drama as a space in which these three cultures negotiate and cooperate with each other. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The first chapter, Nationalism and Its Commercialized Revelry: The Rise of Anti-
Japanese War Drama on Chinese TV in 2005-2013, provides a general picture to 
understand the political-economic conditions which bring up the development of anti-
Japanese war drama. By brief textual analysis and interpreting second hand data, this 
chapter argues that the rise of anti-Japanese war drama shows the dynamic of negotiation 
between liberal market ideology and CCP’s monopoly of power. Besides, interventions 
from propaganda department of the government show the intention of the state to 
maintain an appropriate nationalist discourse. Unfortunately, these interventions impair 
the capability of market to perform efficient self-adjustment.  
The second chapter, Marginal Group, Central Narrative: Analyzing the 
Representation and Narrative of Bandits in Contemporary Anti-Japanese War Drama, 
analyses the how the drama To Advance Towards the Fire articulates the relation 
between bandits and CCP in the war. This chapter employs theories from subaltern 
studies to deconstruct the nation as a homogenizing project, which attempts to replace its 
internal struggle with discourse of dominant power. The drama represents bandits and 
communist soldiers with different types of masculinities, which in turn rationalizes the 
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incorporation of bandits into Communist army. The chapter regards the incorporation of 
bandits as an indicator of ongoing project of colonialism within the nation. 
The third chapter, Within and Beyond the Nation: Analyzing Female Experience 
in Auntie Duohe, focuses on the experience of female in the war and patriarchal family. 
By close reading the drama Auntie Duohe, the chapter addresses nation and family as 
gendered institutions, which express their needs and aspiration in a masculine way. The 
drama reveals the discrepancies between female experience and masculine discourse of 
nationalism, and offers the possibility for women to give their voices under the pressure 
dominant patriarchal order. The drama brings up a alternative peace-making discourse 
through the construction of East Asian femininity, while the alternative discourse is 
suppressed by the dominant nationalist discourse under state censorship. 
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Chapter 1:  Nationalism and Its Commercialized Revelry: The Rise of 
Anti-Japanese War Drama on Chinese TV in 2005-2013 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to celebrate the 60th anniversary of winning the anti-Japanese war in 
1945, the State General Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television 
(SARFT) of China loosened the censorship since 2005 on media production, which drew 
material from the anti-Japanese resistance during WWII (China Insights, 2013a). The 
significant increase in the number of anti-Japanese war dramas on the TV screens has 
been noticed by news media, scholarly discussion and critical circles in the following 
years, although most industrial statistics regarding precise number of production each 
year is not available to general public. According to a list of TV drama serials for each 
major genre (Drama List, n.d.), at least 41 anti-Japanese war dramas were aired for the 
first time in multiple TV channels in Mainland China in the year 2012. Like most 
Chinese TV dramas, each anti-Japanese war drama is only produced for a short period of 
airing, instead of producing series that continue for more than one season in other 
countries like the US (Schneider, 2012, p. 114). Each anti-Japanese war drama has 30 to 
40 episodes, and all episodes are shot prior to the time of airing. Usually two episodes of 
the drama will be aired per night on one channel in prime time, and the drama runs four 
to five days in a week until all the episodes have been aired.  
Some commentaries online pointed out that, Chinese TV screens have been 
occupied by these dramas as new battlefields for anti-Japanese war (China Insights, 
2013a). The dramas blended elements of comedy, romantic affairs and kungfu into the 
plot and used stardom to attract audiences of different age groups. Critical circles 
commonly believe that among all anti-Japanese war dramas produced in these years, 
good ones and bad ones are intermingled. Although a number of them received harsh 
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critiques for poor production quality and over-dramatic plot designs, the overall viewing 
rates of anti-Japanese war drama remained high and more production was thus 
encouraged. 
Schneider (2012) argued, since the beginning of Chinese economic reform in late 
1970s, the force of free market has been unleashed upon the previously state-owned 
media. The role of TV in the CCP agenda also started to shift from the central 
mouthpiece that straightforwardly delivered CCP’s propaganda to an institution that lives 
by both ‘political constraints and commercial incentives’ (Schneider, 2012). It is 
nevertheless too hasty to regard TV industry’s double binding role on state propaganda 
and economic interest as a space for negotiation of two completely contradictory forces. 
Regulations from several regulatory regimes showed how the state expects TV industry 
to be an ideological state apparatus and a prosperous economic sector at the same time. 
According to the 3rd article of Broadcast Regulation (The State Council of PRC 
[SCPRC], 1997), broadcast system including radio and TV should persist in serving 
people, carrying out socialist ideology and correctly leading popular opinion (General 
Principle section). Following that, the 4th article (SCPRC, 1997) demands local 
governments to bring in the development of broadcasting system into the planning of 
national economy, and increase government financial expense on the development of 
broadcast network when needed. As the most consumed one of 15 TV programming 
categories, TV drama industry was required by TV Drama Censoring Regulation (State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television [SARFT], 2004) to also cater to the need of 
market by making TV dramas what ‘the mass enjoy watching’. 
Havens, Lotz and Tinic (2009, p. 236) pointed out that it is off the mark to reduce 
popular culture to an ideological commodity that only reflects the interest of capitalist 
force while neglects the effect of cultural force. They proposed ‘critical media industry 
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study’ as a research approach to combine the different emphasis of political-economy 
approach and cultural study approach. In the combined approach, they consider culture 
anthropologically as ‘how knowledge about texts, audiences and industry form, circulate 
and change, and how they influence textual and industrial practices’, and aesthetically as 
‘how media texts arise from and reshape industrial practices’ (Havens, Lotz and Tinic, 
2009, p. 237). The approach of critical media industry study can find resonance in Stuart 
Hall’s (1998) understanding of popular culture. As Hall (1998) argued, popular culture 
should be situated into its relation with the institute of dominant cultural productions in 
order to see the tension between these two. 
This chapter attempts to use the framework informed by these two scholarly 
works mentioned above to understand the mechanism behind the recent boom of anti-
Japanese war drama. The chapter also hopes to reveal the opportunities and limits that the 
Chinese TV drama industry currently faces. The chapter will be based on brief overall 
textual analysis of several popular anti-Japanese war dramas, and interpretation of second 
hand data including commentaries, interviews with producers and administrative policies 
to address following questions. How to understand anti-Japanese war drama as sub-genre 
evolving from other major genres in the development history of TV drama in China? 
How does state policy and market capitalism work together to rejuvenate a Chinese 
nationalist sentiment through the representation of anti-Japanese war? The chapter argues 
that the rise of anti-Japanese war drama allowed us to see the dynamic of negotiation 
between liberal market ideology and CCP’s monopoly of power that were used to be at 
odds with each other. The phenomenon reflected a flaw in the Chinese TV drama 
industry that overly frequent state interventions have taken over the function of market to 
adjust itself. 
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INTERMINGLED STATE CENSORSHIP AND MARKET FORCE IN GENRE EVOLUTION  
Although the globally spread capitalist ideology pushed commercialized 
broadcasting systems to cater to the need of market, the role of nation-state in TV 
industry remains prominent as the whole industry largely relies on the nation to support it 
in terms of institutional construction, such as content quota, license fee and media 
infrastructures (Straubhaar, 2007). In terms of products, the TV industry is still 
considered a national project, which constructs national identity and national culture by 
producing cultural products that informs common national imagination among its citizens 
(Straubhaar, 2007; Robertson, 1990). Taking Chinese media as an example, broadcasting 
system operating according to Communist ideology is expected to fulfill certain roles to 
serve the government by promoting certain behaviors while discouraging others (Siebert 
et al. 1963, as cited in Browne, 1989, p. 14-15). Therefore programs of communist 
broadcasting system often have specific requirement on program content and tend to 
tackle related themes like “working for common good, participating in political process, 
supporting the cause of working class”. 
As Curtin (2007, p.2) has argued, although the control by the state remained as 
“ideological and infrastructural limitations”, film and TV industry of mainland China still 
became part of the globalizing capital market which takes in commercial competitors 
especially after the political and economic changing taking place across different regions 
of the world at the end of 1980s. Nowadays, the negotiation between market ideology and 
state control is constant displayed by Chinese TV industry. To and Yep (2008, p.168) 
proposed a theoretical framework to understand the contradictory ideologies Chinese 
leadership seek to reconcile since the 1990s when economic reforms were re-launched. 
According to To and Yep (2008, p.168), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on one 
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hand would hold on to the vision of creating ‘socialist men’ by imbuing party ideologies 
into media in order to solidify its political impact; on the other hand, the wave of 
commercialization brought by globally spread capitalism has complicated the traditional 
political oriented model of media operation in China.  
According to Zhu, Keane and Bai (2008), TV drama narratives during 1980s that 
depicted the social change and conflict in the process of economic reform were regarded 
as ‘realistic dramas’, as opposed to ‘historical dramas’, which drew materials from epic 
themes. As the term ‘main melody’ was used in official discourse as an analogy of CCP’s 
ideology and agenda in times of economic reform, those ‘realistic dramas’ that stood in 
the same ideological line with the ‘main melody’ were also referred to as ‘main melody 
dramas’ which often won the favor of propaganda and cultural departments. In the late 
1970s, building a legal system that acts in concert with the reform plan was one focus of 
CCP’s agenda (Zhu, Keane & Bai, 2008). TV drama since 1980s started to feature stories 
about policemen pursuing criminals or uncovering crime plots as a way to construct the 
image of strong legal system among audiences. The fever of crime drama lasted till 2000s 
when the inclination of representing bloody and violent crime scenes caught attention of 
SARFT. As a result, SARFT took all crime dramas off the prime-time screen since 2004, 
accusing these dramas for containing “violent, sex, gore and horror” (Zhu, 2008, p.8). 
According to the classification of CSM, the media market research company whose 
researches cover TV programs in both mainland China and Hongkong, ‘military 
revolution’ is one of the 8 genres that belong to the category of ‘modern drama’ (Zhu, 
Keane & Bai, 2008, p.11). At the beginning of 2000s, several military themed dramas 
started to incorporate entertainment into the plots by portraying the family life of military 
officers as one of the story lines besides spectacles of war. The shifted focus to the 
everyday life and interpersonal relations of heroes were proved to be successful market 
 12 
strategies to attract wider audiences. One of the dramas, Unsheathing the Swords (aired 
in 2005), attained high average audience share at 10.3%. This chapter argues that anti-
Japanese drama can be regarded as a sub-genre of ‘military revolution’. Similarly, anti-
Japanese war dramas since 2005 also absorb elements of personal life such as romantic 
affairs into the plot to soften the masculine narrative of the war-drama. Following section 
will provide more detailed analysis of how these elements were kept in anti-Japanese war 
dramas to attain a larger market reach. 
The genre development of Chinese TV drama shed light on how to understand anti-
Japanese war drama. The attempt here is not to rule out the effect of state censorship over 
genre evolution, a purely market driven phenomenon, or to claim anti-Japanese war 
drama as a distinct genre that is completely imposed by state propaganda. Instead, the 
chapter urges to treat the boom of anti-Japanese war drama as a phenomenon that 
happened at a specific historical moment, while still displays continuity of genre 
development over time and the regular role of state in it. As previous studies showed, TV 
drama industries in China have a keen sensation to detect the official emphasis on the 
republic’s development at different stages. The TV dramas often accurately grasp the 
ideological inclination and timely reflected it in productions. 
The year 2005 was China’s 60th anniversary of winning anti-Japanese war. On Aug 
12th 2005, Chanchun Li, the member of CCP Central Committee of the Political Bureau, 
and Yunshan Liu, the head of Propaganda Department of CCP Central Committee, 
visited Chinese National Museum for the exhibit on the history of Nanjing Massacre 
(Chinese News, 2005). Li pointed out that Chinese people’s revolutionary anti-Japanese 
war played an important role in the world’s anti-Fascism resistance, and the victory was a 
testimony to the Communist Party’s efficient leadership among different ethnic groups. 
The history also showed that China stood firmly in safeguarding the peace of the world. 
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Therefore Chinese people, especially young generation, should be educated about the 
history (Chinese News, 2005). This visit was covered in the news titled Changchun Li: 
Keep the history in mind, work with passion, and bring about a great rejuvenation for 
China (Li Changchun: Laoji lishi fafentuqiang shixian minzu weida fuxing) by Xinhua 
News Agency which carries the mission of propaganda for CCP since 1930s 
(Introduction of Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). 
On Aug 30th 2005, Shi Zhao, the vice chief of SARFT gave a speech on a 
symposium held by SARFT to address how Chinese mass media should respond to 
CCP’s instruction (Leaders’ Speeches, 2005). His speech titled “Keep the history in 
mind, work with passion, and contribute power for the great rejuvenation for China” was 
clearly an official respond on behalf of the SARFT to Changchun Li’s instruction. Shi 
raised three requirements for conducting broadcasting systems in the new era, 
emphasizing that the role of the Chinese broadcasting system to lead public opinion, to 
satisfy spiritual and cultural demands of the people and to meet the needs of market 
oriented economy should be enhanced. These three requirements evidenced an open 
space in the official discourse for the negotiation between state sponsored ideology 
control and market leading free competition. Together with broadcasting news, film and 
compilation documentary, TV drama is one component of SARFT’s plan to coordinate 
with the propaganda of central CCP committee. As Shi summarized, from July to 
September of 2005, 16 anti-Japanese war dramas with 360 episodes in total had been 
aired in provincial TV channels. From Aug 13th to Sep 5th, prime time periods in all 
provincial TV channels had been occupied by anti-Japanese war dramas in order to create 
the atmosphere of anniversary in the national reach. 
The purposeful promotion of anti-Japanese war drama by SARFT inspired the TV 
industry to pick up the historical subject matter as the base of drama creation. The 
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enthusiastic of industry was further encouraged by SARFT’s loosening censorship. In the 
year of 2005, more than 20 anti-Japanese war dramas passed the initial proposal review, 
and the number rocketed to more than 70 in the year 2012 (Japanese Channel, 2013). The 
quantity was a huge leap comparing to past years, when 3 anti-Japanese war themed TV 
dramas and films were produced annually on average from 1949 to 2004 (Drama List, 
n.d.). 
The loosening of censorship on the anti-Japanese theme however was only one 
factor of intervention that contributed to the growing of anti-Japanese war drama. This 
particular sub-genre of military drama played a role of safe option when the state placed 
limitation on subject matters that did not reflect CCP’s ideology properly. For example, 
behaviors like crimes, religious activities, and tendencies to trust noncommunist 
governments were discouraged (Browne, 1989, p. 14-15). In the word of Zhangke Jia 
(2013), who is regarded as the representative of the 6th generation Chinese film director, 
the prosperity of anti-Japanese war drama was a reflection of the limits placed on the 
creation of genre dramas. 
This is the reality that genre production has been repressed in China. Shooting 
stories about police is difficult, because it touched upon the image of public 
security organ. Shooting crime drama is prohibited, because it revealed social 
reality. Gangster dramas are forbidden, because they say gangsters should not 
even exist in China. We also cannot shoot horror dramas, because China holds 
atheism. At last, the anti-Japanese theme makes a figure. They hold the amulet for 
being politically correct and hence can rampage across the market (Jia’s Weibo 
post, 2013, Mar 23th, 16:20). 
NATIONALISM SUPPORTED BY LIBERAL MARKET IDEOLOGY 
As Mankekar (1998, p.36) argues, national media are prompted by two forces. 
The first is the ideological intention to consolidate national hegemony and repress 
dissidence, and the second is the economic interest that can be realized by having a 
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sizable national market to attract advertising. This is not to assert that there is a pan-
national culture ready to be put on the screen, neither to say that a national market is 
naturally available to be reached. However, the argument of Mankekar pointes to the 
possibility of a media product to construct a ‘nation’ and interpellate its audiences as the 
national body to fulfill the vision of a national market. In the eyes of TV drama 
producers, anti-Japanese war dramas seems to be more qualified than other genres for the 
purpose of national market. According to the TV professional Ming Hua who was 
responsible for the funding allocation to support choicest cultural products in the 
province of Guangzhou, the high viewing rate anti-Japanese war drama is associated with 
audiences’ shared opinion on the importance of the war in modern Chinese history: 
Viewing rate is still the most important criteria for TV stations to decide what to 
air. (For TV dramas) viewing rates means guaranteed audiences, advertising 
investment and broadcasting channels at the same time. For example, if a drama 
talks about the invasion of Japanese pirates in Ming dynasty, it will obviously 
have lower viewing rates than our current anti-Japanese war dramas… because 
audiences are not familiar with that part of Chinese history. (China Insights, 
2013b) 
In this sense, the popularity of anti-Japanese war drama is not only due to the 
nationalist sentiment against Japan as an invader, at the same time the audiences’ pre-
existing knowledge about anti-Japanese war requires them no extra effort to digest the 
drama within its historical background. Chinese audiences can familiarize themselves 
with the history anti-Japanese war through multiple ways. As one of the must-haves of 
Chinese history textbooks, majority of Chinese students in primary schools and middle 
schools are expected to know about it. Besides, it is reasonable to conjure that Chinese 
audiences will get increasingly familiar with the history by seeing anti-Japanese war 
dramas that have been produced numerously in recent years.  
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As the safest option of TV drama production that serves the CCP’s promotion of 
nationalism, the task of anti-Japanese war drama is to seek ways to capitalize the 
nationalist expression to the greatest extent. In order to do so, it must make sure 
audiences’ fundamental idea of the war is not radically challenge; and applying 
diversified elements to ‘decorate’ the history is also important to keep audiences 
interested.  
The most significant common strategy of anti-Japanese war dramas is to create a 
clear division between ‘righteous Chinese people’ and ‘evil Japanese soldiers’. There is 
an intention to reduce the image of Japanese soldier to a symbol The director and script 
writer o the drama Shahukou (aired in 2009) Jizhou Xu received 80 suggestions for 
revision from the censoring department (China Insights, 2013b). One of the suggestions 
asked him not to emphasize the high military quality of the Japanese army, but only make 
the cruelty of Japanese soldiers prominent. Xu said with frustration that the current 
artistic creation environment only wanted to show audiences a version of Japanese army 
which is not much smarter than idiots, so that his effort of portraying a realistic image of 
Japanese soldiers will be put to vain. Learning from the previous experience, when Xu 
worked on his second anti-Japanese war drama Everlasting Designation (Yongbu Momie 
de Fanhao) in 2010, he just borrowed the Japanese character Saito Ichi from famous 
cartoon Rurouni Kenshin instead of creating an original one.  
Actors also realized that producers of the drama only wanted to see simplified 
images of Japanese soldiers. A Chinese figurant summarized several basic tips of playing 
a Japanese soldier. Since the crews always picked figurants who look a bit ugly and 
ferocious to play Japanese soldiers, he just shrank his back, narrowed the eyes and try to 
make himself look wretched (Feng, 2013). Several Japanese actors who live in China, 
such as Ichida Koji, Miura Kenichi and Tsukagoshi Hirotaka, were often asked to play 
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Japanese military officers in Chinese TV dramas. They expressed their doubt about the 
way Japanese were represented, because these characters “were not like Japanese people, 
sometimes not even human beings” (Net Ease Enertainment, n.d.). Once in shooting, the 
director asked Hirotaka to jump off the horse and rape a Chinese woman he saw in the 
snow. Hirotaka told the director that the plot is too unrealistic as no one would want to do 
this in a freezing weather, while the director insisted, “this is how Japanese people were 
at that time”. According to the experiences of Japanese actors, Chinese TV drama 
directors cooperated with have a stereotypical image of Japanese in the mind and also try 
to reinforce the image in the TV drama. Japanese actors were often told to reduce the 
representation of internal conflict when the characters were about to kill civilians, and 
only play “devils without humanity” (Net Ease Entertainment, n.d.).  
The weak fighting ability of anti-Japanese war dramas is another denounced feature 
of anti-Japanese war dramas. Chinese often killed the Japanese soldiers easily in illogical 
and unexpected ways. In To Advance towards the Fire (Xiangzhe Paohuo Qianjin, aired 
in 2012), an armed Japanese unit was wiped out by a small group of Chinese soldiers 
using rocks. In Leave no Japanese Devil (Yige Guizi dou bu liu, aired in 2013), the 
Chinese butcher killed all the Japanese soldiers invading in his village with his 
broadsword, although the soldiers were equipped with guns and swords. The most quirk 
scene appeared in Legendary Knights (Kangzhan Qixia, aired in 2010) in which a 
Chinese man threw a Japanese soldier into the air and tore him into two halves. This 
bloody scene incurred intense discussion online, and most people rebuke the over 
dramatic exaggeration as a disrespectful representation of history.   
There is a popular joke online about the overflow of anti-Japanese war drama: A 
descendant of a Japanese soldier came to China to morn his ancestor who was killed in 
the war, so he asked the taxi driver to take him to the site of old battle field where 
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Japanese army suffered the most disastrous loss. The taxi driver thought for a while and 
then took him to Hengdian World Studio (Popular Culture, 2013). Hengdian World 
Studio is the largest studio for film and TV shooting in the world. It sits within the 
economically most developed part of China and has the fame of ‘Chinese Hollywood’ 
(Hengdian World Studio, n.d.). In 2004, Hengdian World Studio was approved by 
SARFT as the only national development base of Film and TV industry. In 2012, the 
studio received 150 crews to shoot TV drama or films, and among them 48 were dealing 
with anti-Japanese theme (China News Weekly, 2013). In the same year, the Hengdian 
Studio Actors Association used figurants for 300 thousand person-times, and about 60% 
of figurants had played Japanese soldiers at least once (Feng, 2013). As a figurant actor 
Shi said, he played Japanese soldiers for 200 times in more than 30 dramas in 2012. 
‘Dying’ in these dramas as Japanese soldier took a big proportion of his acting and his 
record was ‘dying’ 8 times in a day. The joke about Hengdian World Studio actually 
reflected the true market need of mass formulaic production in which the ‘death’ of 
Japanese soldiers is treated as a norm. 
As SARFT required, TV dramas should “use varied methods to portray vivid and 
touching artistic characters; apply realistic emotion, positive life attitudes and high 
aesthetic standard to promote central socialist value”, the theme responds well to the call 
(Announcements, 2009). Regardless whether anti-Japanese war dramas exaggerated 
‘realistic emotion’ in order to manifest dramatic conflict, the dramas showed an active 
attempt to be innovative in “portraying vivid and touching artistic characters”. One of the 
strategies is the incorporation of Chinese kungfu and to emphasize its constructive role in 
prompting the progress of the warfare. For example, in Arrow on the String (Jian zai 
xianshang, aired in 2013), the heroine used her bow and arrow to fight against Japanese 
soldiers who were equipped with guns throughout the whole drama. In another drama, the 
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hero avoided all bullets from more than ten Japanese soldiers while jumping off a cliff, 
and meanwhile he threw out his darts to the enemies and killed all of them. The inclusion 
of Chinese kungfu or martial arts indicates a vicissitude of genre, as they previously only 
appear in pre-modern dramas as an essential element for legendary tales (Zhu, Keane & 
Bai, 2008, p.10). 
In China the TV drama audiences’ main age group is older than 45, the viewing 
time increases as the audience group’s average age goes up (Schneider, 2012, p.138). As 
a result, using stardom is another widely accepted strategy to maintain the popularity of 
anti-Japanese war dramas among young audiences. In TV drama industries of Mainland 
China, Hongkong and Taiwan, there is a term ‘idol drama’ used for TV dramas that 
predominantly feature stories of young people which usually include romantic affaires in 
the plot. ‘Idol drama’ cannot be classified as a genre, as they do not have a presumed 
conventional theme or subject as other genres do. The most significant feature of ‘idol 
drama’ is its use of stardom or the attempt to create new stars through the drama. Due to 
the fact that idol dramas tend to attract young audiences especially young female 
audiences, in some cases it is whether the actors or actresses are good looking instead of 
how well they can act that decides the popularity of idol drama. Some anti-Japanese 
dramas also adopted the same logic of using popular idols. In The Northwestern Wolf 
(Zhanhuo Xibeilang, aired in 2012), the leading actor Hawick Lau was originally a 
contract artist of TVB from Hongkong. Lau gained popularity among mainland audiences 
in late 2000s. Yuanbo Wu, the scriptwriter of The Northwest Wolf claimed that war 
dramas and idol dramas can be combined in an organic way. He juxtaposed the features 
of both type of dramas to point out they are not contradictory to one another: 
Idol dramas are for the enjoyment of eyes. I use idol dramas to present war 
dramas, and audiences like the aesthetic effect. When the beauty (of idol drama) 
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is torn apart by tragedies (of war), the show then attains its dramatic punch. (Sun, 
2012) 
NATIONALISM OUT OF CONTROL AND THE SYSTEM FLAW BEHIND THE SCENE 
The prosperity of anti-Japanese war drama reflected the lingering of market 
adjustment. As some professional commentaries claimed, Chinese TV industry lacked an 
overall planning to predict the performance of the market (Duan, 2013). The high 
quantity but low quality of anti-Japanese war dramas revealed a fact that an effective 
selection mechanism is missing. After promoting anti-Japanese war drama for years, 
although it seems market has not been acting like saturated yet, SARFT has already 
detected the illness of the genre and attempted to intervene the market operation. In May 
2009, SARFT announced its evaluation and suggestion of recent anti-Japanese war 
dramas (Announcements, 2009). The announcement criticized that “some anti-Japanese 
war drama lack innovative contents, and the industry should pay attention to the 
tendency.” The announcement also required broadcasting production institutions to put 
more energy on improving the quality of ideology conveyed by TV dramas. In terms of 
content creation, artists should have the courage to bring forth new ideas and avoid 
following market trends blindly.  
In 2013, SARFT raised more specific requirement to regulate anti-Japanese war 
dramas. Satellite television channels were required to modify or take off those dramas 
with excessive amount of entertainment elements before airing, even though these dramas 
have already passed the end-product censorship (Entertainment News, 2013). Famous 
actor and the member of CPPCC National Committee Daoming Chen argued that some 
of the recent anti-Japanese war dramas are distorting the history by applying elements 
that do not match the true history (Yu, 2013). Chen’s perspective expressed a mainstream 
concern over the genre which claims that using elements of entertainment to 
 21 
commercialize anti-Japanese history is regarded as a misleading practice which will 
shape false conception of Chinese modern history. Chen also insisted that, because anti-
Japanese resistance is a part of Chinese modern history which is a condensation of 
China’s suffering and humiliation, the mediated representation should not be allowed 
with too much space for artistic processing. 
When online controversy pushed anti-Japanese war drama to the focus of public 
opinion, SARFT clarified that the purpose of restriction is only to eliminate those with 
inappropriate entertaining elements. As the vice director of SARFT’s TV division said, 
“the anti-Japanese history is the great song of praise to memorize China’s resistance 
against the foreign invasion, hence the representation of the history is the obligation and 
mission of all artists…Only those neglected historical facts should be corrected.” 
(Entertainment News, 2013) As a result, a number of channels re-examined those dramas, 
which have already passed censorship earlier to meet the requirement of SARFT (Duan, 
2013). 
Theoretically, the meddling of SARFT should effectively improve the quality of 
anti-Japanese war dramas by altering the content and limiting the number. It seems the 
role of SARFT successfully make up the deficiency of the market in self-adjusting. 
However, the irony is that the frequent proposals of prohibitions from SARFT have 
intervened the free operation of TV market and impaired its ability to satisfy the need of 
audiences. In recent years, SARFT imposed varied and specified restrictions on popular 
TV dramas, especially on prime time dramas. For example, dramas with themes of crime, 
royal family conflict, and time-travel cannot be aired at prime time (Net Ease 
Entertainment, 2011). These genres were among the most popular genres among TV 
dramas. As Hong (2002, as cited in Schneider, 2012, p.9) argued, the growth in 
broadcasting capability goes hand in hand with an increased demand for popular TV 
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entertainment formats. Hong’s argument confirmed the entertaining function of TV 
dramas is important in satisfying the market. However, the prohibitions of SARFT 
largely narrowed down the range of options for producers in terms of subject matters, and 
attempted to restrict the function of TV drama as entertainment. The attempt basically 
goes against the nature of a free market. Family drama and anti-Japanese war drama are 
the safest types of dramas that are still popular among audience (Duan, 2013). The 
narrow range of themes pushed producers to navigate a new path within the range to 
catch eyeballs. Therefore the motivation of being distinct prompted the genre to mingle 
with entertainment elements such as the using of stardom and kungfu. Unfortunately, 
entertaining the audiences was not the goal of SARFT at the first place, and they saw the 
excessive entertaining elements as a threat to the authenticity of the nationalist discourse 
they wanted to construct through TV dramas. 
CONCLUSION AND LIMITS 
This chapter analyzed the boom of anti-Japanese war dramas from 2005 to 2013, 
and argued that the popularity of the particular genre could be partly attributed to the 
purposeful encouragement of state policies that aim at preserving nationalist discourse in 
the media space. The policy encouragement soon opened a window for the increasing 
number of dramas to influx into the market. When the drama reached to certain number, 
the abuse of entertainment brings the dramas a bad name for distorting history. However, 
the frequent state intervention policies have limited the capability of the market to 
encourage producers to explore new genres. Finally, SARFT used its capability to 
interfere the operation of market in order to keep a healthy circulation of ‘appropriate’ 
nationalism discourse. This phenomenon showed how the reconciliation between global 
spread ideology of capitalist free market and nationalism happens when state policy and 
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market work together. The phenomenon also evidenced that global spread capitalism is 
not necessarily producing a global cultural hegemony, while discourses like nationalism 
that is specific to certain groups can be promoted as well. 
The argument of this chapter is largely based on the analysis of media text, 
policies and the industry; therefore it helps to understand the booming of anti-Japanese 
war dramas from the perspective of production. This information can help to speculate a 
general reaction of audiences. However, this chapter has not addressed the reception of 
the dramas in order to deconstruct the phenomenon from a different angle. As the online 
criticism indicated, audiences hold negative attitudes towards these dramas.  While the 
high viewing rates and continuously emerging new dramas prove that a considerable 
number of audiences are still watching them. Besides, the constituent of audience 
population is still unknown. What makes people watch these dramas despite their poor 
quality of content and production could also be explored in greater detail by other 
methodologies like interview which pays attention to individual subjectivities in media 
consumption. 
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Chapter 2:  Marginal Group, Central Narrative: Analyzing the 
representation and narrative of bandits in anti-Japanese war drama 
Anti-Japanese resistance in China has been interpreted dominantly as a collective 
national action in the official discourse (Sang, 2011). When the rise of anti-Japanese war 
dramas became a phenomenon since 2005, the dramas attempted to address the 
participation of the whole population. A great number of dramas do not only feature 
soldiers and intellectuals as the participant of war on the Chinese side, while there was a 
conscious emphasis on the contribution made by ordinary people or marginalized group. 
In the narratives of those TV dramas, the inventory of protagonists has been expanded to 
mining workers (Jiézhènguó Chuánqí, aired in 2011), handicrafts men (Shénqiāng, aired 
in 2012), students (Lièbiàn, aired in 2013), hunters (Xiàngzhe Shènglì Qiánjìn, aired in 
2013) and so forth. Notably, bandits appear as main heroes in several popular anti-
Japanese war dramas. Famous ones such as Snow Wolf Valley (Xuělánggǔ 2012), Snow 
Leopard (Xuěbào 2010), Brave Journey to the Northeast (Chuăng Guāndōng 2008), and 
To Advance towards the Fire (Xiàngzhe Pàohuŏ Qiánjìn, aired in 2012). These dramas 
have the average first-time airing viewing rate from 3.5% to 6% in major cities of China 
(Sohu Video, 2010; Wang, 2008). In these dramas, bandits either cooperate with the 
Communist army in the warfare or get incorporated by it and become part of the 
legitimate armed force in the revolutionary movement.  
To Advance Towards The Fire (Xiàngzhe Pàohuŏ Qiánjìn, 2012) is one of the 
shows that articulate the role of bandits as part of the anti-Japanese armed force during 
WWII. Its producer Hairun Movies & TV is the largest private media production 
company in mainland China and has produced more than 2500 episodes since its 
founding in 2000 (Hairunmedia, n.d.). The show was first aired in 2012 by eight 
provincial and municipal TV channels in Mainland China. Its first week airing in Jiangsu 
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Satellite Television (JSTV) achieved the highest viewing rate during among all the prime 
time shows across the nation, and the viewing rate of the last episode came back to the 
top of ranking list (Entertainment, 2012). The outstanding viewing rate could partly be 
attributed to the stardom of the Taiwanese actor Wu Qilong who entered the 
entertainment industry in 1988 as a pop singer. In recent years, Wu’s fame in Mainland 
China has amounted to another peak because of his remarkable performance in a number 
of popular TV dramas. In To Advance Towards The Fire, Wu played the main character 
Lei, who is the head of a bandit gang. After the carefree life of bandits was destroyed by 
the war, Lei and his fellow bandits joined the anti-Japanese resistance and finally became 
a regimental commander of the Communist army. 
The post-colonial studies of nationalism pointed out the relation within the nation 
is often rendered as “kinship” because of the un-selectable attribute of nationality, while 
the naturalized nationalism should not mask its internal frictions which pertain to all 
types of “manipulation, conspiracies and the pursuit of private interest” within the nation 
(Anderson, 1983, p. 8; Chatterjee, 1993, p.3). The construction of nation is a normalizing 
project that aims at managing its internal fragments and differences as unthreatening part 
of a hegemonic culture. These fragments are not natural “microcosms” of a bigger 
history, while the way we treat them matters in terms of how history is constructed 
(Rodriguiz, 2011; Pandey, 2000, p.281).  
Pandey (2000) believes that, the study of “fragments” should pay attention to the 
“voice from the edge” and look at the history from a marginalized perspective that might 
disturb the coherence of its perceived totality. Guha (1998a, p. 35) refers to these 
“fragments” as “subaltern”, which means the “inferior rank” which occupies the lower 
end of social hierarchy “in terms of class, caste, age, gender and office or in any.” Based 
on his observation of the historiography of Indian nationalism, Guha (1998a; 1998b) 
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argues that modern nation and nationalism were attributed to the achievement of the 
bourgeois nationalist elitism and colonial elitism in the narrative of official history. The 
elitist discourse reduces nationalism to a simplified stimuli-response model, which has a 
prejudice to deny the independent contribution of the subaltern to the national project 
(Guha, 1998a & 1998b).  
As this chapter will discuss in greater detail later, the rise of bandits indicates 
social crisis, and their activities challenge existing social structure (Billingsley, 1988). In 
this sense, the way discourses of bandits appear in popular culture, especially the 
representation of how they take part in a national project of war, will show resistance, 
incorporation, and negotiation taking place between marginalized group and dominant 
political power.  
This chapter will closely read one serial TV drama To Advance towards the Fire 
to examine the narrative of history and the representation of bandits through textual and 
discursive analysis to examine the media text at “the very intersection of colonialism and 
historiography”, as a way to understand the power behind the narrative (Guha, 1994, 
p.51). The main questions to be addressed in this chapter are as follows. How does the 
drama acknowledge bandits as a fragment of the nation that has distinct interest and 
independent contribution in the war? How does the drama relate the representation of 
bandits, especially bandit’s masculinity, with the formation of political power of CCP? 
How does the transformation of bandits serve the hegemonic discourse of the 
party/nation? Borrowing Spivak’s words (1988, p. 281), my work is not going to claim 
authenticity for any version of history, whereas the emphasis is on how “an explanation 
and narrative of reality was established as the normative one”. 
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THE HISTORY OF BANDITS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
A number of historical studies have been devoted to understand the mechanism 
behind the emergence and development of bandit gangs in China (Billingsley, 1998; 
Zhou and Shi, 2004; Chen and Xie, 2012, etc.). As Billingsley (1988, p.3) notes, the 
choice of joining a bandit gang is usually a rational reaction to a specific social 
environment which left marginalized group or individuals with limited options to survive, 
although official document would describe it as an irrational and desperate anti-social 
behavior. Throughout Chinese history for over one thousand years, poverty, famine and 
political instability which lead to economic insecure for civilians can all cause growth of 
bandits (Zhou & Shi, 2004, p.39). Historically, the invasion of Japanese army in the 
northeast part of mainland China caused a new wave of bandit resurrection, and the 
number of bandits reached to at least 20 millions in late 1930s (Billingsley, 1988, p.1). At 
beginning of Japanese invasion, the rapid increase of bandits was caused by the disturbed 
agriculture production. The tendency was intensified by the migrating of Nationalist 
government, which resulted in large number of fugitive soldiers who wanted to sustain 
living by selling weapons. Given these characteristics of Chinese bandits, they became an 
object for strategic contest of Nationalist government, Communist Party and Japanese 
army during the anti-Japanese resistance (Billingsley, 1988). 
Although bandits have the potential to become part of armed force, their realistic 
material pursuit still limited the possibility of keeping any long-term political loyalty, 
especially in times when multiple military or political powers play seesawing games 
(Billingsley, 1988). Therefore, to channelize the accumulated rancor of bandits, and to 
prevent them from being a social threat become the vital task for any regime that 
attempted to rule China. In WWII, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) realized that their 
power is the weakest among three contesting political powers in Mainland China, 
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therefore how to utilize the great number of bandits creatively to gain support from the 
public became one of the main tasks (Chen & Xie, 2012). The special political condition 
at that time explains why Communist Party has the tradition to not reject bandits, but to 
imbue them with socialist philosophy in order to transform them ideologically. In the 
year 1930, Mao pointed out that the Red Army and local party organs should actively 
implement “educational training” among members of bandit gangs to precipitate their 
acceptance of socialist revolutionary ideology (Chen & Xie, 2012).  
However, ideological transformation was only one component of the 
incorporation process, and it was mainly directed to bandit gangs, which initiatively 
asked to be incorporated (Zhou & Shi, 2004). In practice, who to incorporate and how to 
deal with those who are not willing to be incorporated often times reflected the intention 
of CCP to enlarge and reinforce its own orbit (Billingsley, 1988). Billingsley (1998), 
Zhou and Shi (2004) all point out that CCP used different strategies to address bandit 
issues according to the varied power dynamic of bandit groups in different regions. In 
areas that have been dominated by Communist military power, suppressing bandit 
activity was an effective strategy to gain public support for the Communist party. In areas 
where bandits have established their network or have cooperated with either Nationalist 
government or Japanese, Communist Party tried to persuade them to accept incorporation 
or at least stay neutral among three political forces (Billingsley, 1988). In some other 
cases, the Communist Army publicly executed the head bandit of the gang as a way to 
deter other bandits.  
To sum up, the history of bandits in China indicates a relation between the 
marginalized group and unstable social system. Since their activities can be regarded as a 
resistance against existing social orders, political powers usually seek ways to keep their 
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activities under control. Consequently, the way bandits and dominant political powers 
interact with each other demonstrates how nation is being formed ideologically. 
BANDIT AS INDEPENDENT CONTRIBUTOR IN ANTI-JAPANESE RESISTANCE 
The opening scene of To Advance Towards the Fire starts with a footage of reality 
documentary. Besides the battle planes shooting across the sky and the bombing barrage 
rising on the horizon, the image quality resembles old films in order to enhance the 
feeling of the factuality of war. The voice-over set forth the historical background of the 
show for the audiences that China is experiencing the final stage of anti-Japanese war 
when Japanese army has already been defeated in the battles on Pacific Ocean. Lei and 
his bandit gang appear in the second scene in which they are playing with some advanced 
firearms including a canon, which was given to them by a Communist army. Contrast 
with the first scene that depicted the fierce battle, the second scene has a delightful 
atmosphere made prominent by the light-hearted background music. One subordinate of 
Lei jokes that the Communist army is a miser, and its attempt to incorporate the bandit 
gang with such small ‘bribe’ is naïve. The third scene switched over to battle field again, 
while this time it creates a sense of presence by showing a small residual of Communist 
army leading by their commander Jiangong fighting with the Japanese army which has a 
larger number of soldiers and firearms. The first three scenes form a contradiction 
between standpoints of the bandits and the Communist army in the war: one fought 
actively regardless the sacrifice, and the other one cared only about their own pleasure 
and interest while being indifferent to the national crisis. Later in the episode, Jiangong 
talkes about his interaction with Lei, “I tried to pull him [Lei] into our [Communist] 
army, but he turned me down every single time, otherwise our army would have been 
much stronger. He didn’t fight against the Japanese much, but he isn’t a bully to villagers 
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either, seems those rich landlords are his main targets.” In another conversation, when 
asked to join the Communist army, Lei answered, “Can we not talk about this? With our 
firearms and gold, we can just enjoy our carefree life.” (Episode 1) 
The first battle between the bandit gang and the Japanese took place soon when 
the bandits witnessed Communist army and Japanese army fighting in a valley. However, 
they took action because Lei saw a female Communist soldier Yufei was in danger, and 
she coincidentally resembled his dead fiancée. After Lei and Yufei had opportunities to 
know each other, Lei started to accept Yufei’s suggestion and joined battles in times of 
crisis as a way to please her. Although it seems Yufei succeeded to integrate the bandits 
as part of the anti-Japanese resistance, Lei only cooperated for his personal interest to 
impress Yufei as a woman he has interest in. In the beginning part of the drama, the 
refusal to join Communist party appears several times as an expression of bandits’ 
independent interest. As they value money and easy life instead of political appeal, the 
desires of bandits formed a resistance to the Communist party’s attempt of incorporation. 
The refusal also signals the failure of nationalism and communism to explain the 
motivation behind the deeds of bandits. It can be argued that, in the beginning of the 
drama, bandits appear as an independent anti-Japanese power with their distinct interest. 
THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTING BANDIT 
In order to understand how the autonomy of bandits was positioned and valued in 
the grand narrative of the drama, a comprehensive scrutiny of bandit representation is 
needed. The chapter wants to emphasize how these representations serve to articulate a 
power relation between CCP and the bandits. 
This drama often displays Lei’s participation in anti-Japanese battle as an 
expression of personal heroism that manifests his masculine power. In a number of 
 31 
battles, Lei appears at a critical time when Japanese army has almost killed everyone, and 
his advent could easily turn the table around. Sometimes, Lei has one on one fight 
between him and a Japanese enemy. Although the rival was extraordinary in battling, Lei 
still wins the battle every time because of his bravery and promptness. The exhibition of 
masculinity is conducted under a female gaze, as in most cases Yufei stays close to watch 
Lei fighting, worrying about his safety at the same time. The presence of woman in the 
battlefield turns fighting into a performance of Lei’s personal masculine charm. The 
cinematography of the drama also helps to display the bandit’s masculinity for audiences. 
Lei’s fightings are usually captured by long shots that concentrate on every movement 
and facial expression of the actor.  
The construction of hyper-masculinity of bandits in the drama conforms to the 
need of audiences in the post-communist era. As Song (2010) argues, since China has 
opened up its market to the globe, the traditional Maoist types of masculinity has started 
to experience a crisis under various flows of cultural impact. Because the Maoist 
ideology privileges class struggle in its official discourse, heroes in the revolutionary 
time are often portrayed as “selfless and asexual”, while these monotonous images fail to 
attract audiences today. The representation of bandits or bandits-like figures in TV drama 
can be regarded as an embodiment of re-masculinizing Chinese culture in the post-Mao 
era (Song, 2010, p. 406). 
After Lei’s fortress was bombed away by the Japanese army, the bandits settle 
down in a village. They meet Jiangong, the former commander of a Communist regiment, 
who was injured in a battle in which he also lost all his soldiers. As Jiangong and Lei 
both like Yufei, the two men regard each other as rival. The conflict is soon escalated to 
the contestation over leadership. As both of them wanted to organize a local resisting 
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force and take the leadership. As a result, they decided to recruit their own team in ten 
days, and whoever recruited more followers will be the leader of the region. 
The bandit gang tried to organize a revolutionary force in the way they organize 
themselves. Therefore they believe material wealth is the right incentive to buy the 
villagers to their side. The bandits did not see how a resistant army should be different 
from a bandit group, and their following actions proved that they still operate with their 
bandit logic. Therefore they promised villagers, whoever joined their team will be given a 
gun and some money. Instead of using material inception, Jiangong’s team focused on 
ideological reforming which was the tradition of the Communist party. They went to 
villagers and promoted their Communist army as a team, which unites ordinary people 
and represents their interests. They started to teach villagers to sing the March of the 
Volunteer that became the national anthem after the 1949. The passionate lyrics ‘arise, ye 
who refuse to be slaves. Let us amount our flesh and blood toward our new Great Wall’ 
largely inspired the villagers. The villagers were all attracted by the Jiangong’s depiction 
of a utopian communist regime with ‘no oppression and dictatorship’, which will allow 
each ordinary people to ‘have their own house and receive education.’ The following 
words said by Yufei spoke to the mobilizing role of communist party in the anti-Japanese 
resistance: 
My good people, yes our army is not strong enough now, but as long as we unite 
together, then the 4 billion people in our country will become our army. If no one 
of us fights against the Japanese, then we’re allowing them to do whatever they 
want in China. (Episode 9) 
Although the representation of bandits reflected the “projection of post-
communist values onto the communist past”, the representation of CCP members in the 
drama still largely followed the routine conventional masculine image in Maoist time 
(Huang, as cited in Song, p. 421). As Berry (2004) argued, literature of Mainland China 
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has the tradition to emphasize on the traits of characters. In the Mao era, literatures tend 
to have simple didactic paradigms of characters in order to draw a clear line between 
good and evil, hero and villains. Traditionally, individual features that might threaten the 
coherence of individual identity are also regarded as a threat towards the collective 
identity of the nation (Bhabha, 1990, as cited in Berry, 2004, p. 80). Hence Chinese 
literature and media products in the early post-war era would consciously rule out the 
unharmonious element. Even in the post-Mao era, whether literatures should be allowed 
to portray more complex but realistic characters, especially heroes, was still the focus of 
debate within the circle of artists. In To Advance Towards the Fire, Jiangong and Yufei’s 
images obviously represented the image of Communist Party. Their representations as 
soldiers who are ‘morally and politically pure and certain in their visions’ can be 
regarded as a revival of literature tradition of Mao’s era in the contemporary TV drama 
(Berry, 2004, p.111). The mascunility Jiangong embodies also reflects a regression back 
to Maoist asexual communist soldier. Although he likes Yufei, he does not explicitly 
express his affection, while keeps their relationship as pure comradeship. In the drama, 
different types of masculinity embodied by bandits and communist soldiers compensate 
each other. 
The different approaches of recruiting not only embody the ideological difference 
of bandits and communist army. More importantly, the contradiction predicted a relation 
between the bandits and the communist in the anti-Japanese resistance. The bandits are 
represented as simple, violent and unsophisticated; on the other hand, the Communist 
Party appears to be a persistent team that has clear political appeal even in its low tide 
period. Contradiction also appeared in Yufei’s judgment on both Jiangong and Lei. She 
talks about Jiangong with a tone of admiring. He was a teacher with great knowledge, 
and also an idol who attracts young female students including hers. Yufei describes 
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Jiangong as ‘a fire in cold night, a lamp in the darkness’ that illuminated her and guided 
her. However, when asked whether she likes Lei, Yufei answers jokingly, ‘I just feel he’s 
not grown up yet.’ The child like image of Lei serves as a metaphor, which implicitly 
suggested bandits are an immature force in the revolutionary movement. Even though 
both teams aim at protecting the nation and casting out the enemy, the distinct difference 
implicitly pointed out that Communist Party has the attributes of a political leader, while 
the bandits need to be led by the Party to become a true efficient revolutionary force. 
When one examines the ‘representation’ of bandits, it is important to think about 
it from two aspects, ‘speaking about’ and also ‘speaking for’. On one side, the drama 
speaks about bandits in a certain way in which they are regarded as an independent 
nationalist revolutionary force. They are righteous and patriotic Chinese people who 
defend the nation against foreign invaders, while their minds are simple without political 
vision. They are also physically capable but mentally immature soldiers who fight on 
their passion rather than strategy. This chapter argues that, to fix static image of the 
bandits is not the ultimate purpose of the drama. Because the bandits are not a visible 
component of contemporary Chinese society, their stereotype constructed in the drama 
does not serve a direct political purpose as stereotypes of other social groups might do 
today. Then we should focus more on understanding the bandit’s stereotype as part of an 
official narrative, which speaks for them, and defines their position in the normative 
history. In other word, the construction of significantly opposite representation of bandits 
and CCP members will help to rationalize the narrative that emphasizes the role of CCP 
in transforming bandits. 
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THE ERASURE OF DIFFERENCE 
Hershatter (1993) raises critique about Guha’s notion of subaltern, which posited 
the subaltern as the opposite of the elite. Hershatter argued that, the subaltern-elite 
dichotomy considered the social position of subaltern fixed regardless of its conscious 
action. For instance, the experience of 20th century China provides evidences to 
complicate the clearly cut edge between the subaltern and the elite (Hershatter, 1993). 
According to Johnson (1962), the most significant disturbing force in the contemporary 
history of China came from the rise of CCP itself since 1921. CCP presented its growing 
as a nationalist revolutionary movement which liberated peasants and workers from the 
oppression of imperialist power and native landlords. During WWII, the common 
national crisis was utilized by CCP as a tool of social mobilization. What has been 
blurred in the war is the relation between the elite and the subaltern. CCP consciously 
aligns itself with the interest of civilians, in order to mobilize them to join in the armed 
resistance against Japanese invasion that was the most direct foreign threat at that time 
(Johnson, 1992).  
The war-time popularity legitimated the post-war authority of CCP in governing; 
hence the pre-PRC mass alignment with the ordinary people has evolved to the 
identification in the form of state with its people. As Hershatter (1993, p.107) notes, the 
centering of people in the dominant historiography has in fact continuously kept its 
presence since the establishment of PRC in 1949. Great emphasis has been placed on 
encouraging the subaltern to ‘speak’ by collecting and publishing oral histories which 
reflected the experiences of peasants and workers about how they resisted against feudal 
and imperialist authorities (Hershatter, 1993). Therefore, in the history of China in the 
20th century, it is overly simplistic to articulate the relation of subaltern and elite as 
completely opposite to each other. The blurred elite-subaltern distinction is important, 
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because it could help one to understand the way subaltern groups appear in Chinese 
literature. 
Gladney (2004) suggests, minority and rural regions are often chosen by Chinese 
artists as an optical angle from which they deconstruct Chinese society. Gladney also 
believes that these marginal can offer a safe while critical space for artists to question the 
center in the stringent political environment. On the other hand, the marginal space was 
given significant political connotations in earlier Chinese literature from 1940s-70s 
(Zhang, 2010). Chinese literature portray these spaces not only as the seedbed of which 
cultivated ‘authentic’ Chinese culture, but also as the womb which gestate revolutionary 
power that liberate the nation from the hand of imperialism and feudalism. Given its 
central role of marginal space in Mao’s revolutionary movement, rural areas in China are 
both the margin in geographical sense and the center in political sense (Zhang, 2010). 
The ideological connotation of rural area in China set forth the theoretical foundation for 
understanding the activities of marginal groups like peasant and bandits which often take 
place in those spaces. 
In this ideological context, the bandits enjoyed some positive political connotation 
in Chinese literature of 20th century. Chen (2012) argues that, Chinese literature in 1910s 
largely picture bandits as “righteous people who deified the authority and helped the 
poor”. These literatures have been influenced by radical revolutionary ideology rising 
with the ‘May 4th movement’ in 1919, and usually praise bandits as heroes who insist on 
their vision to resist social inequality. The discourse of bandits and the discourse of 
socialist revolutionaries are mingled together in the poem written by Moruo Guo who 
extolled leftist thinkers and political leaders from Marx to Lenin as the ‘bandits’ of social 
revolution. Determined by the ideological trend of the society, there is no clear cut 
between political leaders and bandits in the revolutionary period (Chen, 2012). The vague 
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segregation provided ideological foundation for the bandits to appear in later literature as 
anti-Japanese heroes. 
The 1930s witnessed the prosperity of novels based on the history of anti-
Japanese war, and bandits started to appear in these novels as main characters who 
participated in the resistance (Shao, 2007). The discourse of bandits as nomads of the 
society rules is dissolved by the discourse of revolutionary movements (Cai, 2010). In 
this period, literatures mainly used two means to handle the representation of bandits, 
including ‘combination model’ and ‘growth model’ (Shao, 2007). In the combination 
model, the notorious deeds of bandits like robbing and bullying co-exist with their brave 
participation in the anti-Japanese resistance. The war created the possibility for the bandit 
to be villain and hero at the same time. However, the ‘growth model’ emphasizes the 
erasure of bandit’s negative attribution. The ‘growth model’ is widely applied in the 
novels of writers from Northeast part of China, which suffered the most severe ravage 
from the Japanese invasion (Yan, 2002). After the Culture Revolution ended, Chinese 
media products started to feature more mature Party figures who lead the immature Party 
members or non-Party members to develop stronger trust in Communist faith (Berry, 
2004). In the narrative of “growth model”, war becomes a milestone which transformed 
bandits from ‘Robinhood’ to ‘heroes of the history’. In the ‘growth model’, the lead of 
Communist Party plays the key role in guiding the bandits. Only through gradually 
attaining the consciousness of class revolution, can the bandits become eligible soldiers 
who identify with the proletarian and national interest (Shao, 2007).  
The scholarly discussion mentioned before grounded the possibility for the 
transformation of bandits to happen in the drama. The construction of apparently opposite 
representation of bandits and Communist Party helps to rationalize the narrative which 
emphasizes the leading role CCP in transforming the marginal group. The second half of 
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the drama addresses the process of transformation that turns subalterns into elites. The 
transformation supportes Hershatter’s (1993) critique about Guha’s elite-subaltern 
dichotomy, that the opposite relation can be disturbed in social evolution. At the same 
time, it also speaks to Spivak’s argument that once subaltern speaks independently, it is 
no longer remained in the subaltern position (1988). 
Because of some irruptive events, the competition between Jiangong and Lei 
ended up with nothing conclusive. Experiencing war together, both of them started to 
know more about the other side and developed some sort of connection. Lei finally 
agreed to join the Communist army and served as a unit captain; then his bandit fellows 
automatically all become Communist soldiers. 
In the drama, death of bandits signifies the transformation and the response to a 
collective call greater than the interests of individual or sub-groups. With the aggravation 
of warfare, several important supporting roles die in battles, including the ones who 
previously were bandits and those who were Communist soldiers from beginning. In the 
funeral, they are all commemorated as martyrs. The funeral can be regarded as the ritual 
through which the contribution of bandits were recognized and recorded in the official 
history. The title ‘martyr’ addressed their new role, while their past as an outsider has 
been strategically neglected. After the gang was incorporated, one of Lei’s favorite 
subordinate was executed for raping a woman. He stepped on the execution field 
unflinchingly to show his compliance to communist military discipline. Here the 
obedience of bandits to the CCP resembled the obedience of a son to father or a younger 
brother to an elder one. The original masculinity of the bandits characterized by their 
physical capability and lack political vision or discipline is transformed into new type 
masculinity, which is maintained within the control of patriarchal familiar order.  
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Jiangong also died in the final battle when he tried to save Lei. His sacrifice was 
based on a construction of a selfless national brotherhood that attempts to transcend the 
division of class. The transcendence is achieved exactly through the military corporation 
and ideological exchange in the project of anti-Japanese resistance. After Jiangong’s 
death, a long shot was used to focus on Lei who dashed ahead into the gunfire regardless 
of his own safety. The sound from the battlefield suddenly weakens to a vague 
background noise, while Lei’s voice coming from his mind arose as a voice over. 
Jiangong, finish your words, I promise not to talk back this time…You’re so silly 
that never plan for yourself. You carry all kinds of “-isms”, things like democracy 
and universal welfare in your heart…Your heart is really big, even bigger than 
sky…But my heart is small, so small that it only has space for my mom, those 
buddies I brought out from the fortress…and Yufei, and you…You’re always my 
brother. From the day I met you, you’ve been my good brother. (Episode 40) 
These words from Lei’s mind are thought provoking. Lei said he did not 
understand communism or nationalism that Jiangong always mentioned as his political 
viewpoint. However, his incapability to digest the Communist ideology did not impede 
Lei from joining the war and serve the nation. More importantly, the neglect of 
Communism in this circumstance does not pose a meaningful resistance to the ideology 
itself. In Lei’s words, what Communism claims is mingled with nationalist expression, 
which appears in a formulation of family and kinship. Hence, just as nationalism, 
Communism is also naturalized. Communism is represented not as a hard-core theory, 
which ordinary people cannot digest, while as something residing in human nature and 
everyday practices. When Communism appears as a ‘transparent’ membrane that does 
not distort the neutrality of history, it is made easier to accept the narrative from the angle 
of Communist Party.  
In the last scene, Lei leads his regiment to salute to the oriflamme for the first 
time in his military uniform. He became a Communist soldier without understanding 
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Communism. Before that, even after he joined the anti-Japanese resistance, his outward 
appearance always marked him as an outsider of the army. Critical circles criticize his 
leather jacket, overalls, sunglasses and fashionable hairstyle as ‘unrealistic’. More 
importantly, these outfits marked his difference with other Communist soldiers, and 
emphasized his past as a bandit. It symbolized the past of Lei as a bandit, which was 
embedded into the attributes of the character and refused to diminish. The change of 
clothes signified Lei’s transformation from a head of bandit to a leader of communist 
army. The differences between bandit gang and communist army were eventually erased, 
not through any kind of mutual concession, but through a willing submission from one 
side.   
Applying Stuart Hall’s (1973) theory on “encoding and decoding”, this chapter 
argues that the discourse around CCP as the only legitimate and effective political power 
in the liberation movement is message media products attempt to convey. In the national 
project, marginalized groups like bandits must submit the lead of CCP and transform 
themselves in order to make valuable contribution. It is a dominant-hegemonic position 
that dominant institution hopes audiences to identify with while deconstructing the 
meaning of text. However, this chapter wants to take the negotiated position to decipher 
the text in order to open up new possibilities to challenge the validity of dominant-
hegemonic code. From the fact that Lei becomes a leader of communist army without 
understanding communism, we know that the submission is not complete in terms of 
ideological transformation, even though bandits can all dress like communist soldiers.  
In the light of post-colonial theories on nation and nationalism, the drama To 
Advance Towards the Fire provides a case of analysis in which the bandits took a leading 
role in the whole narrative. However, we must note that with the application of ‘growth 
model’ which emphasizes bandits’ identification with communist ideology as a sign of 
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getting politically maturing, Communist Party is still constructed as the ‘taken-for-
granted master’ of history (Shao, 2007). It does not allow other social groups to speak for 
their own history outside the Communist scope (Berry, 2004). 
CONCLUSION 
As Pandey (2000) argued, subaltern ‘fragments’ in the narrative of history are a 
powerful resistance from the below when they are not merely treated as one part of 
historical ‘totality’. By preserving an ‘oppressed narrative and perspective’, the fragments 
have the potential to point to the illusive image of nation as natural entity, and also 
expose its internal struggle which never cease to exist. The way Chinese bandits were 
related to power center and speak through it in the media space revealed the construction 
of modern nationhood as an ‘ongoing project of internal colonialism’ (Gladney, 2004).  
The drama To Advance Towards The Fire shows two layers of ‘internal 
colonialism’, which support and validate each other. The first layer of ‘internal 
colonialism’ lies in the incorporation of bandits in modern China. Just as what imperialist 
colonial power did in foreign countries, the ‘internal colonialism’ implemented by 
Chinese Communist Party on bandits was similarly marked by violent deeds and 
ideological transformation. However, the drama chose to represent the process in a 
natural way. The second layer of ‘internal colonialism’ refers to the legitimating and 
promoting of a certain version of historical narrative through media production.  
In the drama To Advance Towards The Fire, the bandits are constructed as an 
immature power of anti-Japanese resistance whose motivation combines nationalist 
sentiment and personal interest. The simple representation of Communist Party as mature 
political leaders who can genuinely speak for the people, the Party’s legitimacy of 
leading the anti-imperialist resistance is constantly confirmed. The opposite 
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representations of bandits and Communist Party serve the goal of a normative narrative 
which privileges the leading role of the latter one in social revolution. The drama 
represents the process in which the bandits ‘grow’ under the guidance of Communist 
Party and finally become one part of it. As a result, the bandits are allowed to speak and 
preserve their experience in the official history, while they can only speak through the 
voice of Communist Party. 
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Chapter 3 Within and Beyond the Nation: Analyzing Female Experiences 
in Auntie Duohe 
From late 2009 to early 2010, the 34-episode TV series drama Auntie Duohe 
(Xiaoyi Duohe) was aired in 18 terrestrial TV stations in China. During the airing days, 
its popularity was approved by high viewing rates and market share (Baidutieba, 2009). 
For example, the show attained the average viewing rate of 8.5% and 18.24% of the 
market share when it was aired by Jinan News TV Channels (JNTV); the broadcast by 
Zhejiang TV Channel 4 (ZTV4) achieved highest single episode viewing rate of 9.2% 
(Special Topic: TV drama Auntie Duohe, 2009a). The drama was adapted from the novel 
Little Aunt Tatsuru (Duohe is the Chinese translation of Japanese name Tatsuru) written 
by famous female Chinese-American writer Geling Yan. Besides the solid original work, 
media commentary stated that the success of Auntie Duohe should be contributed to its 
strong production team including famous script writer, director and actors (Special Topic: 
TV drama Auntie Duohe, 2009b).  
The story of Auntie Duohe took place in a rural village in north eastern China at 
the end of anti-Japanese war. The male protagonist, Jian, was the only left son of old 
Chinese couple whose other son was killed by Japanese in the war. Jian’s wife, 
Xiaohuan, lost her fetus in an accident caused by Japanese soldiers and became infertile 
since that. In the market, Jian’s parents saved a 19 year-old Japanese girl Duohe whose 
whole family died in China during or after the war. Despite voices of opposition from the 
rest of the family, Jian’s mother insisted to keep Duohe at home and treated her like a 
daughter. Jian’s parents also planned to let Duohe bear a son for Jian after she recovered. 
After learning the harm Japanese army did to the Chinese family, Duohe wanted to pay 
back the grace of the family and therefore agreed with the proposal of Jian’s parents. 
Later she gave birth to one daughter and two sons. Duohe kept her real identity as a 
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secret, and she lived in the family for more than twenty years as the ‘aunt’ of her three 
children.  
Unlike most anti-Japanese war drama emerging around the same time, Auntie 
Duohe did not focus on how men and women fight on the battlefield to redeem the 
endangered national honor. It gave narrative priority to how the war caused suffering to 
ordinary Chinese and Japanese people, especially women, and how these women strive to 
cope with the accidental change in their personal lives. As Goodman (2002: 15) argued, 
the way women understand the war can highlight the discontinuity between private and 
official history. Therefore, the examination of unique perspective in the drama has 
significant meaning, because it will reveal how women are placed into both nationalist 
and peace-making discourses, and also show us the dynamics between the two. The main 
questions I will address in this paper are as follows. How does the drama use suffering of 
women in the war to resist the discourse of masculine nationalist honor and the normative 
patriarchal order of the family? How does the drama de-emphasize national differences in 
its narrative in order to envision a harmonious Eastern Asia based upon the shared 
characteristics of femininity? What could be the critique about the association between 
female and peace-making discourse? The drama was finally approved for airing through 
satellite TV in 2012, while it had to alter the ending in order to meet the national 
censorship requirement. In the last section, I will also talk about how the nationalist 
discourse was brought back by the altered ending, which is a compromise to make for 
larger market reach. 
MASCULINE HONOR AND INCONSISTENT FEMALE EXPERIENCE IN WAR 
Verdery (1994: 227) referred to nation as an important cultural relation that 
negotiates the connection between the state and the subjects of the state. While dealing 
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with Japan, the drama constructed the relation between the state and its subjects as a 
distant one, in which the state and the national body did not politically align. The power 
relation between the state and its national body has been revealed at the opening scene of 
the drama, as the voice-over stated: 
…August 15th, Japanese government declared surrender at discretion. At the 
same time, the Japanese ultra-rightist who wished to carry on militarism instigated 
innumerable innocent Japanese civilians to suicide in order to ‘die for the glory’ 
before the dawning of peace. (Episode 1, 2:55) 
The involvement of the state in war was often associated with its control over the 
national subjects’ physical bodies or territory in a gendered relation (Verdery, 1994: 227). 
In the opening scene, the state of Japan was represented by ‘Japanese government’ and 
‘Japanese ultra-rightists’ which threatened the lives of ‘innocent Japanese people’. The 
gender that usually identifies with war is male, because the framework of war brings the 
feature of traditional masculinity, which is to be stronger than femininity, in to play 
(Ivekovic, 1993: 115). The preference of being stronger is not limited to physical power, 
but can also be applied to social, political, historical or military power (ibid). As 
McClintock (1993, 62) pointed out, the need of the nation-state is resulted from the 
‘frustration and aspiration of men’. In this scenario, the control of the state over its 
citizen’s physical bodies is a manifestation of masculine state power. In the nationalist 
discourse, nation in war is normally incarnated into women to remain in a position of 
victim. Therefore the victim/aggressor dichotomy is also a gendered construction to 
represent international relation in the war (Ivekovic, 1993: 124). If the scope focuses on 
the inner domain of the nation, the victim/aggressor dichotomy can be transformed into a 
gendered victim/fighter dichotomy that describes the relation between the state and the 
national subject (Yuval-Davis, 1997:28). When the nation-state need its people to suicide 
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in order to protect the masculine national dignity from being stained by other nation, the 
national subject has been victimized as ‘women’ who are expected to be submissive to 
the patriarchal order and also be protected by the male fighters.  
In the drama, the representation of innocent Japanese civilians is crystallized into 
the portrait of Duohe. Her whole family was sent to China by the Japanese government 
with the Manchuria Exploit Group before the war started. Latter her father and brother 
both joined the army and died in the battle. When Japanese army was defeated, the 
government commanded the whole village of Japanese civilians to commit suicide in 
group in order to maintain the national glory. Duohe’s description of her experience 
revealed the discrepancy between her personal feeling and the promoted national honor. 
After more than ten years of living in China, she shared her experience at the end of the 
war with a Chinese man she fell in love with, 
I remembered clearly about that autumn. I was at my grandpa’s house, and 
suddenly the village was in chaos. All the villagers were driven to a forest close 
by. There was a huge hole. I saw one person shooting to everyone with a machine 
gun and the crowd fell down. My grandparents didn’t want me to die, so they told 
me to run. I was lucky enough that I hid in the grass and fled away. The whole 
village, more than five hundred of people, committed suicide together. My 
grandparents were among the five hundred, but I couldn’t find them. It frightened 
me out of my senses…I told Japanese people in other villages, no one wanted to 
die, so they fled away altogether. Someone died out of starvation, someone died 
because of sickness. It’s a nightmare. (Episode 19, 33:20) 
Duohe still used the word ‘suicide’ to describe what happened to Japanese 
villagers, while the fear of Duohe, her grandparents’ attempt to save her and the decision 
of other Japanese people indicated that these people did not fully identify with the 
national honor and were not willing to end their lives for its failure. When the individual 
voices were not fully incorporated into the nationalist discourse, the gendered 
fighter/victim relation within the nation was also disturbed (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 24). 
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Instead of being a fighter that protects the right of its own people, the nation-state of 
Japan appeared as a ‘murderer’.  
Xiaohua’s experience also showed how the experience of Chinese women in the 
war can be read as a defense of male national honor. When she was in the seventh month 
of her pregnancy, she and other women encountered Japanese soldiers on a hill. They 
tried to run, but several women were still caught, raped and killed. Tao Japanese soldiers 
chased after Xiaohuan so that she was forced to the edge of a cliff then fell off. She lost 
her fetus and was infertile ever since. Jian’s family thought, Xiaohuan would also be 
raped and killed if she did not fell off the cliff, so what happened to Xiaohuan was a 
fortune in her misery. Rape is often defined as ‘a crime against honor’ instead of a mode 
of torture (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 110). The focus has been placed on the impaired dignity 
of men and the community, rather than women themselves who are directly harmed 
physically and psychologically (ibid). In this logic, Xiaohuan preserved the male honor 
when she fell off the cliff, when her ‘other sisters all got trampled by Japanese soldiers’ 
(episode 5, 22:05). It resulted in the de-emphasis on her physical and psychological harm 
at the individual level. 
SILENCED WOMAN IN PATRIARCHAL FAMILY 
As Chinese authors from the wartime believed that the liberation of nation is a 
fore-condition of individual liberation, they have the tradition to include female 
characters as participants of anti-Japanese resistance in order to contain experience of 
women as part of nationalist discourse (Liu, 2004). A number of contemporary anti-
Japanese war dramas (e.g. Meili Wusheng aired in 2008, Langdduhua aired in 2007) also 
inherited this tradition that female characters would step out of the home to fight in the 
war together with men. Hence, like other discourses of Chinese revolutionary movement, 
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anti-Japanese war has its own liberating function that provided an opportunity for women 
to break down the boundaries between traditional gender roles and participate in public 
affairs. As a result, the differences between gender roles in the war project were 
constantly neglected in the construction of female characters in order to maintain them in 
the anti-Japanese discourse (Liu, 2004: 8). Contrarily, the drama Auntie Duohe chose to 
write about the experience of most Chinese women who were still the second-gender in 
their everyday life. Their stories cannot be dissolved by revolutionary nationalist 
discourse. The instability they experienced in war did not break down the gendered 
constraints for them, while the burden of maintaining a home required them to carry out 
their normal duties of women, including reproduction and care taking even in 
disturbances (Liu, 2004: 9).  
According to Collins (1998: 62), traditional family ideal is based upon the 
legitimacy of heterosexual marriage and their children born through the marriage. The 
significance of the marriage tie and blood tie within the family explains why women’s 
capability of reproduction is in the center of ideal family model. When women are 
expected to not transcend the gendered space division and stay at home, they are also 
expected to behave in accordance with their gender identity carry out their role of wives, 
mothers and caretakers in the family (McClintock, 1993:67). Therefore, the aspiration for 
a family to carry on its lineage can place direct pressure on women’s (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 
22). In the drama, Jian’s father blamed Xiaohuan for not being considerate, as she should 
allow her husband to sleep with other woman for the sake of bearing children. Xiaohuan 
also internalized the pressure from the family, and having no child gave her a sense of 
insecure. Xiaohuan constantly felt her status in the family threatened by Duohe, as she 
said, ‘A woman with no children is like grass on top of a roof. She could not grow on the 
man’s heart, and even the earth that she rooted in is too thin (Episode 12, 32:40).’ To 
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Xiaohuan, women depend on family just as grasses depend on the earth, so women would 
become lifeless without family as the main source of their identity. It also implicated the 
central role of connection children play to legitimate the status of women within the 
family. Xiaohuan often referred to herself as a ‘hen which lays no egg’ (Episode 2, 22: 
10), indicating that an infertile woman is useless to the family. Duohe’s fate was reflected 
the family’s value on women’s reproduction capability. At the beginning, keeping Duohe 
to bear children for the family was an important reason why Jian’s parents saved Duohe, 
and the family even planned to send her away after she gave birth to a son.  
Yuval-Davis (1997: 28) pointed out that the supporting voices of vitro 
fertilization and surrogate motherhood attempt to reduce women from lower economic 
and ethnic positions to their ‘wombs’. The word of Jian’s father implicated the same 
‘women as wombs ’logic that how women think, feel and change in the process of 
conceiving is not taken into consideration by patriarchal interest. It is also torturing for 
Jian and Xiaohuan to accept Duohe as a surrogate mother, because they love each other 
deeply and would not allow a third person to threaten their marriage in any way. 
However, they were not able to neglect the strong desire of Jian’s parents to have a 
grandchild, especially a grandson. As a result, Jian promised Xiaohuan that he and Duohe 
would only have sex relation for the purpose of bearing child, he would not develop 
personal feeling towards her, and Xiaohuan would always be the only eligible mother of 
the child.  
In the two year period, Duohe gave birth to a daughter and two twin sons. After 
Jian’s parents passed away, the whole family moved to a city. Xiaohuan told Duohe to 
hide her true identity so that the children and anyone outside the family should only know 
her as Xiaohuan’s younger sister. According to Xiaohuan’s instruction, Duohe learnt to 
walk like a Chinese people instead of using quick short steps as a Japanese woman. She 
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also had to pretend that she was mute whenever she spoke to someone outside the family 
in order to hide her Japanese accent.  
Duohe was not only physically mute to the outside; her right to speak for herself 
in the family was also suppressed by the patriarchal order within the family. No matter 
what Xiaohuan asked her to do, she always accepted without raising any dissenting 
opinion. The consequence of war forced her to give up all her identities and gave her a 
twisted one in a Chinese family in which she was denied the right to be a Japanese 
woman, a mother and a wife. Duohe took in her new identity quickly and submissively. 
She would only nod quietly every time Xiaohuan nitpicked about her Japanese behavior 
or scorned her because of jealous. She understood that her muteness to outsiders was a 
way to protect the family honor, so she chose to not say anything even when people 
talked about her unfairly. Chen (2012: 200) argued that Duohe’s flexible identity 
embodied the docile femininity which allows women to deal with traumas and absorb the 
injustice without directly confronting them.   
    The metaphor of muteness can also be applied to analyze Xiaohuan’s 
sacrifice to maintain a normative family image based on the regulation of patriarchal 
order. When Duohe was pregnant with the first child, Xiaohuan stuffed a pillow under 
her cloth and walked on the street so that people would notice her ‘pregnancy’. She also 
had to explain to acquaintance that her infertility was cured, even though it did not 
happen. Seeing Jian’s family taking special care of Duohe during pregnancy was difficult 
for her, while she must pretend to be happy in front of other people. Many years later, she 
also had to live with grievance because Jian had special feeling for Duohe. However, she 
was not able to talk about the pain inside her heart to people including her families.  
While Rajan (1993: 19) was discussing women’s position in the ritual of sati, he 
pointed out that the privacy and incommunicability of pain can constitute the identity of 
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human subject. In the drama, protagonists did not speak out their sufferings openly, 
neither did the expressions of personal suffering always form a direct resistance against 
patriarchal order, while these expressions are often subtle and only appeared in several 
fragments of narrative. Duohe, Jian and Xiaohuan finally decided to follow the plan of 
the elders in the family. However, their consent did not mean they completely submitted 
to the patriarchal authority. The incomplete submission is manifested by self-ambivalent 
reaction of main characters. In one night, Xiaohuan urged Jian to sleep with Duohe so she 
could have a child soon. After Jian was gone, Xiaohuan covered her head under a quilt 
but cried so loud that all other families in different rooms could hear her. The next 
morning, Xiaohuan asked Jian if he had sex with Duohe, Jian said ‘you were crying so 
loudly, how can I do that?’ Xiaohuan pretended to blame Jian for not acting manly, ‘you 
just cannot get anything done!’ At the same time, a subtle but happy smile appeared on 
her face. The contradictions in Xiaohuan’s behavior demonstrated her unwilling 
obedience to the authority in the family. Although she was not able to speak out her true 
desire, her action still formed a strong question to the powerful patriarchal order by 
presenting her pain, struggle and sacrifices in front of it. 
In the drama, there was a wilderness in the city where protagonists chose to go 
whenever they wanted to do things that social normality would not accept. When 
Xiaohuan finally compromised with other families to let Duohe bear a child for Jian, she 
ran into the wilderness and cried there. When Duohe and Jian fell in love with each other 
after living for years in the same family, they went to the wilderness every day for secret 
dating. After Xiaohuan found out the relation between her husband and Duohe, she drank 
pesticide in order to kill herself, and she entered the wilderness in the midnight waiting 
for the end of her life. The wilderness was also the place where Duohe told her Chinese 
fiancé Xiaoshi about all her experience including her true relation with Jian’s family. 
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Geling Yan, the author of the original novel Little Aunt Tatsuru, was born in 
China, while she lived a diasporic life in the US for long time with American citizenship. 
Although this paper does not attempt to assume a relation between the author’s diasporic 
identity and her writing style, it is interesting to see how traditions of Chinese literature 
and American literature both informed her writing of wilderness in the novel. Chinese 
literature exhibits ‘wilderness’ as a sign of regression. In the history of Chinese literature, 
the subject-object dichotomy between humankind and the nature appeared after 220BC 
(Wang, 2009, p.110). It is when Chinese literature started to represent nature as an 
aesthetic object, while before that nature and human beings were regarded as an 
integrated entity. Therefore the progress of human civilization, which set human apart 
from nature, implies a loss of connection between human beings and their originality. In 
Chinese ancient poetries, city always appeared as the center of political dispute and the 
target of war, while wilderness remained outside of artificial constructions as a spiritual 
homeland (Wang, 2011, p.86). In the tradition of Chinese literature, entering the 
wilderness signifies the seeking of a true spirit of ‘self’ and the encountering of the most 
basic human needs (Ye, 2006, p. 25). Therefore, when Duohe revealed her true identity in 
the wilderness, she reunited with her lost ‘self’. She and Jian could finally face their 
emotional and physical attachment as part of human nature instead of social immorality. 
In American literature, the imagination of wilderness pertains to the experience of 
European colonizer in the new continent where the absence of church and aristocracy 
bestowed a sense of hope and freedom on the space (Yang, 2000, p. 59). For the 
experience of women, entering wilderness is idealized as a process of liberation (I do not 
mean to validate colonialism which takes the discourse of ‘liberation’ as an excuse to 
perform exploitation in its masculine nature). Thinking metaphorically in feminist critics, 
the wilderness is an untamed zone outside the territory of the dominant, a ground for 
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female resistance, for patriarchal constraints have no place in it (Showalter, 1981). Can it 
really be considered as a ‘resistance’, if the oppressive agent is not even there? Perhaps 
having a separated wilderness outside the domestic space can be regarded as a gesture of 
non-challenge that legitimates the power of normative patriarchal order. I would argue, 
however, that through the setting of wilderness, the drama acknowledged the existence of 
a different voice of women that could not be raised with the constraint of traditional 
gendered role in patriarchal family. More importantly, it suggested a possibility for us as 
audiences to detect and listen to the voice. 
THE CONSTRUCT OF HARMONIOUS EAST ASIA THROUGH SHARED FEMININITY 
The famous contemporary Chinese writer Meng Wang wrote a commentary about 
the novel Little Aunt Tatsuru, it said, 
In the lively and gentle narration, it utters cries of anguish facing human being’s 
bitterest sorrows in the separation between life and death. Frantic history, rapped 
the natural and the ordinary. How were we and you abducted, humiliated and 
trampled? When is the time to wake up? Is it a novel or a life that is so outrageous 
and absurd? It doesn’t have to be like this (Wang, as quoted in Zhang, 2008: 97). 
Apparently, the ‘we’ refers to Chinese, and the ‘you’ means Japanese. The 
juxtaposing of the historically hostile ‘we’ and ‘you’ in the same position of a discourse 
rarely appeared in contemporary anti-Japanese war dramas in China. Aunt Duohe offered 
a particular case of TV drama that uses a Japanese figure as its main protagonist. As a 
product of mass communication, the drama must find an ideological access for the 
Chinese audiences to identify with the Japanese woman Duohe. The narrative of the 
drama purposefully played down the national boundary between ordinary Chinese and 
Japanese people by letting them share the perspective of war victim.  
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In episode 2, Duohe and Xiaohuan each had a dream about their past traumas in 
the war. Xiaohuan dreamt about how she lost her fetus in extreme terror. In Duohe’s 
dream, seeing her loved families dying in front of her made her frightened and panic. The 
scenes in the dream were in black-and-white, and they were placed together successively. 
Several fragments depicting the two women sleep-talking with pained expression were 
also inserted into the two scenes.  
The editing strategy discussed above embodied the establishment of a shared 
victim position of the Chinese woman with the Japanese woman. It indicated the 
possibility of connection which was developed through their common suffering in the 
war as the weaker and dominated gender of the nation. This connection can be extended 
to a broader level and apply to the shared ground of Chinese people and Japanese 
civilians. In the drama, the tragic experience of Duohe caused Chinese people to reflect 
on their own experiences and rethink the role of Japanese civilians in the war. It is a 
crucial step to take in order to accept Duohe as part of the family. When Xiaohuan’s 
father heard about the plan of Jian’s parents to let Duohe bear children for Jian, he was 
outraged and told Jian he must ‘get rid of the Japanese woman’ by killing her secretly. 
After Xiaohuan’s father knew about what happened to Duohe’s family, he lamented that 
he never expected Japanese people were also victims, not natural killers. Later he agreed 
with the plan of Jian’s parents to let Duohe replace his own daughter to carry children for 
Jian’s family.  
As Yan, the author of original novel said, she did not aim to record any version of 
history, while her interest lied in discovering some aspects of human nature that might be 
buried when the environment was not extreme (Chen, 2012: 199). Yan believed that the 
exploration and understanding of human nature exist across national boundaries (ibid). 
Yan’s writings have the tradition to place female characters in extreme historical 
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environment, and the tendency indicated the author’s attempt to construct a close 
connection between female and human nature (Song, 2013: 146)  
As women are often perceived as the embodiment of human nature, the narrative 
of drama was able to present a sisterly connection between Xiaohuan and Duohe. They 
were supposed to be rivals competing for the role of wife and mother, but the shared 
marginalized position of women in the family and national project made it possible for 
them to develop a bound that transcends hostilities and cultural differences. Both of them 
understood that they were in the current situation because their options were limited by 
the patriarchal order. Xiaohuan once cried in front of Duohe to express her complicated 
emotion which she was not able to tell any other one. 
You really didn’t fail us. You have these three kids with him, but you’re Japanese, 
you can’t be their mother. I am the only one in wedlock with him, so only I can be 
their mom. You think it’s easy to be the mom? Not at all. They weren’t born by 
me, but I’ll suffer from pain if they don’t call me mom. They were born by you, 
and it also hurt me that they can’t call you mom. You work every day to support 
the family, and feed the kids without hearing them calling you mom. Your heart is 
bitter, bitterer than mine, I know it. (Episode 13) 
In order to make the commonality of human nature prominent, the drama also 
played down the conflict of two national cultures. Although Xiaohuan did not want 
Duohe to act like Japanese in public, she showed tolerance and consent when Duohe kept 
some Japanese habits to organize their home. For example, Duohe wanted to keep the 
floor clean as Japanese people would do in their houses. She wiped the floor several 
times a day and she made Japanese geta for each family member to wear at home. 
Xiaohuan and Jian both accepted the foreign custom and felt it interesting. There were 
times when Xiaohuan claimed that Chinese traditions were superior to Japanese 
traditions. Duohe would always surrender to her so they can avoid arguing. She also 
learnt to take care of the family in Chinese way, such as cooking Chinese food. Jian was 
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the most active one to accept Japanese habits. He even told Duohe that Japanese people 
and Chinese people might be descendants of the same ancestors, because they look the 
same and the languages have similarities. According to Duara (1996: 49), every cultural 
practice, like rituals and language, identifies a group and can potentially form a boundary 
for a community. Duara regarded these cultural practices as soft boundaries if other 
cultural groups can also share or even adopt these practices, no matter if the other groups 
are consciously aware of the sharing or not. Comparing to the original novel, the drama 
deliberately reduced Duohe’s cultural identity anxiety caused by diasporic experience 
(Hu and Chang, 2011). Scholars believed that the softening of cultural boundaries in the 
drama reflected a reconfiguration of elite culture in order to cater the need of mass 
communication (Hu and Chang, 2011; Wang, 2010: 262). I want to further probe this 
argument and discuss how the weakened national distinction serves the discourse of 
peace-making. 
The drama successfully constructed a model of co-existence of Chinese and 
Japanese in the same family to embody the dissolving of national hostility between the 
two. The negotiation of cultural boundaries showed the flexibility of women to adapt to 
extreme environments such as the post-war life. The flexibility can be regarded as a 
strategy which is associated with the capability of women to endure hardship. These 
characteristics do not only belong to Chinese women represented by Xiaohuan, while 
they were also visible on Japanese woman Duohe. Song (2012: 147) argued that, the 
concentration on the physical and psychological experience of women in disasters was 
derived from a deep reflection on ‘sex’ and ‘dignity’ in East Asian culture. Although 
these two women were different in terms of cultural identity and personality, they drama 
focused on their common ‘essence’ as Eastern Asian women: tolerance, endurance and 
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persistence (Chen, 2012: 200). In the drama, these attributes made the two women face 
life challenges together instead of holding onto nationalist sentiment.  
After twenty years of living with a fake identity in China, Duohe finally was to 
marry Xiaoshi, a Chinese man who knew everything about her and still loved her. 
However, he died out of accident on their wedding day. At the same time, Cultural 
Revolution started. Jian was thrown into prison wrongly; one of Duohe’s sons found out 
she was Japanese and turned her in; the daughter was mentally ill; Xiaohuan paralyzed. 
Duohe devoted all she had without any complaint to sustain the family in extreme 
difficulties, and at last her selfless effort paid off, the whole family was brought back to 
the right track. The implication of the plot is that suffering will bring out the strongest 
female potential as they conform to their ‘natural roles’ in the family.  
In this sense, the transformation of women in suffering is given some positive 
connotation. The suffering is not only regarded as the consequence of disturbed social 
normative, but it will also reveal the most innate part of humanity that transcended the 
limits of nationalist ideology and made peace a foreseeable future. Rajan (1993: 19) 
pointed out that the representation of women as ‘subject-of-pain’ is constructed around 
the absolute gender dichotomy that either mystifies or naturalizes women as the 
unexplainable ‘other’ of men. Like discourses of birth laboring or sati in India, the 
women become ‘signifiers of value’ after they go through physical or psychological 
sufferings.  
The narrative of the drama consciously hid nationalist discourse under the cover 
of peace-making discourse (Song, 2012: 148). To understand how the drama used women 
to express the peace-making appeals, it is important to review how the gender dichotomy 
works in the discourse of war. Historically, women are automatically associated with 
peace as opposed to the role of men in war as aggressors. Even feminist activism was 
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automatically assumed as anti-military peace activism (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 94). Even in 
the discourse of nationalism, women still appear as a less violent force, which defends the 
nation in a different way (Ivekovic, 1993: 121). In war time, the expected responsibility 
of women in maintaining the inner stability of the family reflects women’s mythical role 
in the keeping the ‘organic order’ that has been disturbed by masculine imperial progress 
(Goodman, 2002: 27; McClintock, 1993: 66). These roles of women can be extended to 
the functions to restore, impair and reproduce the social order in the post-war period.  
Chen (as cited in Feng, 2009: 14) pointed out that the female characters in the 
novels of Yan often embodied a power of ‘utterly tolerant’ which resembles the earth. 
Just like earth can absorb all kinds of nutrition and pollution, female characters in Yan’s 
novel took in everything the environment gave them including all injustices. Chen called 
these women ‘mother of the earth’ who have mysterious power of self-recovery, and can 
amazingly turn ‘filth’ into life (ibid). In traditional Chinese culture, the earth is worshiped 
for its sacred power of reproduction and cleansing. The humble image of the earth also 
resembles females at the bottom of social hierarchy. In contemporary Chinese literature, 
they often played roles of victim, comforter and savior (Feng, 2009: 15). In the drama 
Auntie Duohe, the self-recovery and transforming ability of women are regarded as an 
essential capability to dissolve hate and generate new hope in the discourse of peace-
making.  
Hence, if a shared ‘East Asian femininity’ is the key element in peace-making 
discourse, the related female characteristics that enable women to go through suffering 
would also be praised. In another word, it is to praise the compliance of females towards 
their own disadvantaged status in patriarchal society. By attributing these characteristics 
to women exclusively, the unequal gender relation will be legitimately re-established 
(Feng, 2009: 15). Taken the unequal gender relation for granted is even more dangerous 
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when we use the ‘compliant women’ metaphor as an analogy of weak and marginalized 
culture. As Chatterjee (1993: 118) argued, a colonial way of sympathizing was able to 
transform the oppressed female image into ‘a sign of the inherently oppressive and unfree 
cultural tradition of the country’. In other words, taking the position of weak women will 
actually justify the invasion and assimilation of colonial power in the international arena 
(Feng, 2009: 17). 
THE COUNTERACT OF NATIONALISM 
At the end of the drama, China and Japan re-established diplomatic relation. 
Japanese embassy informed Duohe that her mother actually survived twenty years ago, 
and she had been searching for Duohe since that. Finally, they reunited in China, and then 
went back to Japan. This was the version of ending when Auntie Duohe was aired in 
local TV stations as soon as the production was finished in 2009, while the drama was 
not approved to be aired through satellite TV until 2012.  
One popular conjuncture for the disapproval was that the story was not politically 
correct while covering some critical but sensitive topics in contemporary history of 
China, such as the anti-Japanese war and Cultural Revolution (Netease Entertainment, 
2012a). Another guess suggested that the ‘misshaped relations’ between the three 
protagonists conveyed problematic family ethics to the audiences. In Dec 2008, State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) published a monthly 
announcement about TV dramas in production (Announcement, 2008). In the 
announcement, SARFT required provincial administration sections and production 
companies to advocate ‘correct value and aesthetic standard’ through TV drama, while 
pointing out that some dramas performed poorly in that aspect. According to mainstream 
 60 
entertainment news (Peng, 2009), part of the SARFT’s criticism alluded to the content of 
Auntie Duohe which centered on the abnormal relations within the family. 
Recently, some dramas that portray marriage relations, family ethics and 
sentimentality tend to have suspicious plots and marginalized character settings… 
For example…some drama even relishes the ‘poignancy’ of male protagonist who 
oscillates between two ‘wives’… These contents violate traditional morality… 
and can cause confused, extreme and even wrong values (Announcement, 2008). 
Although the drama script of Auntie Duohe passed the initial proposal review by 
SARFT in 2006, it still went through numerous changes throughout the whole production 
process till 2008. The producer of the drama, Qiance Ma, pointed out that it is actually 
normal for any TV drama to go through stricter censorship before being broadcasted by 
satellite TV, so is any necessary related revision of the content (Zhang, 2012). For 
example, other popular dramas like Cliff (Xuanya) and New Journey to the West (Xin 
Xiyouji) both cut off several plots with ‘inappropriate language and behavior’ before 
landing on satellite TV. Sometimes drama crews would even shoot different endings in 
order to adjust later according to the censoring result (Netease Entertainment, 2012b).  
Anhui Satellite TV (ASTV) finally aired the satellite version of Auntie Duohe in 
February 2012. Unexpectedly, Duohe’s identity was changed unexpectedly from 
Japanese to Chinese at the end. In the final episode, Duohe’s mother told Jian and 
Xiaohuan a secret that Duohe was actually a Chinese orphan who lost her parents in the 
war. She was found on a road by her Japanese step-mom who came to China as a military 
nurse with other families. According to an anonymous insider, the censoring agency 
suggested to change the nationality of Duohe in order to ‘match her excellent characters 
with traditional Chinese virtue’ (Entertainment News, 2012a). The crew regarded this 
change as a ‘forced compromise’ they had to make in order to enter larger market, 
because the alternation of national identity made previous plot less logical (Xiao, 2012).  
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As discussed in previous sections, the discourse of nationalism had been played 
down in the drama by the construction of peace-making discourse which is established 
through shared female experience in war. Showing the existence of female voice that 
cannot be represented by masculine interest in battlefield or domestic space, the media 
text portrayed nation as an entity of on-going power struggle in which dissonance can 
only be repressed while not eliminated. However, as a product of mass communication, 
which was supposed to foreground the nation, TV drama only allowed limited space for 
the alternative peace-making discourse. In the case of Auntie Duohe, the state seized 
chance of censoring to re-imbue the dominant nationalist discourse into the drama. 
On one hand, nationalism is restored by the rapid shift of national identity. After 
Duohe’s mother said Duohe was a Chinese, Jian quickly replied, ‘I never looked at her as 
Japanese in these years.’ Duohe also told Jian and Xiaohuan, ‘No matter where I go, my 
home is always here, you’re always my families.’ As consequence, Duohe only stayed in 
Japan for three years to take care of her stepmother, and then she returned to China, her 
‘motherland’. Duohe whole-heartedly embraced her new identity as a Chinese, whilst all 
her Japanese-ness has been left behind.  
The restoration of nationalism was also manifested by the dilution of peace-
making discourse. With the changed nationality of Duohe, the hardship of two female 
characters can no longer be read as transcendent experience that connects the ordinary 
people of two nations together. The whole story turned to be about the misfortune of two 
Chinese women whose fates were distorted due to the Japanese invasion. Considering 
SARFT’s criticism on the problematic representation of ‘family ethics’, the new ending 
well responded to the criticism by attributing the disturbed normative order to the war. At 
the same time, the new ending implied that peace-making between the two countries is 
only possible if Japan confesses its sinful deeds, just like Duohe’s step-mother told Jian 
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and Xiaohuan that Japanese soldiers killed innocent Chinese villagers. The emphasis of 
Japan as the enemy in media indicated that China is not ready to re-define the nation 
without having Japan as its opposition (Berger, 2012). 
CONCLUSION 
The drama Auntie Duohe has unique value of analysis because it focused on the 
experience of female in the war and patriarchal family. These experiences are closely 
related to the gendered construction of nation that usually expresses its need and 
aspiration in a masculine way. The different role of women in the nation determined that 
their experiences would not be the same with men. The drama showed the discrepancies 
between female experiences and masculine discourses of nationalism, which uncovered 
the suppressed status of women in the nation under the mask of male honor. However, 
the drama also revealed the continuing power struggle between the dominance and the 
dominated, in which women never completely lost their voices.   
The female experiences in the drama also served the peace-making discourse by 
attributing the endurance of women in suffering to a common East Asian femininity. By 
relating women’s role in the nation and family to natural process of reproduction, female 
suffering was glorified as a transforming process. The positive connotation of female 
suffering can be dangerous, for it further approved and solidified a gender dichotomy that 
was grounded in unequal power relations.  
This paper argues that the alternation of national identity in the drama disclosed 
the negotiation of nationalism outside the media text. The revising suggestions of SARFT 
reflected an official concern over the disturbance of dominant discourse, which referred 
to the patriarchal order within both family and nation in this case. The new ending 
prioritized nationalism over peace-making discourse by changing Duohe’s nationality to 
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Chinese. This case study provided a window through which we can observe the 
construction of Chinese modern nationalism, which still relies on Japan as the opposition 
of China. 
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